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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence 
found pursuant to a search of the passenger compartment of Petersen's vehicle 
and dismissing count I of the information charging Petersen with money 
laundering. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Relevant facts as outlined by the district court are as follows: 
On March 14, 2011, Deputies Gorham and Moffett were 
conducting a "criminal interdiction" on 1-90. During this interdiction 
they noticed a vehicle, driven by Defendant, which bore no front 
license plate. The deputies decided to pull the vehicle over. While 
approaching the vehicle to conduct the traffic stop, the officers 
observed that, while changing lanes to overtake a semi, Defendant 
used a two to three second signal when changing lanes. 
Additionally, when Defendant's vehicle traveled back into the slow 
lane of travel, after overtaking the semi, it "didn't leave a very safe 
distance in-between itself and the semi-truck", which officers also 
believed constituted an unsafe lane change. The officers then 
pulled the vehicle over. 
Upon approaching the Defendant, Deputy Gorham noted 
that he was friendly and talkative, possibly "overly friendly". The 
officer noticed that Defendant's hand was shaky. The officer also 
noticed a number of "criminal indicators", which are "seemingly 
innocent things to most people" but, "when taken in the totality of 
the circumstances . . . lead [an officer] to start to develop 
reasonable suspicion. First, the officer noticed the Defendant's car 
was very clean. He also noticed a 12 pack of Diet Pepsi, about half 
gone, sitting on the passenger seat. There were two cell phones in 
the vehicle, some paperwork, an air freshener, and one pair of 
jeans in the back seat. The officer said, alone, the clean car 
means that "[t]he guy's clean." But, the officer noted the 
cleanliness because "most people that travel long distances and go 
on long road trips, they'll throw their fast food wrappers and other 
stuff throughout the vehicle." The Diet Pepsi made the officer 
suspect that Defendant was on a long journey and needed caffeine 
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to stay alert and awake. The two cell phones interested the officer 
"because most people that traffic drugs, or sell drugs, or buy drugs 
will often use multiple cell phones to avoid detection ... " The 
jeans interested the officer because "it just showed a - an initial 
lack of luggage. Most of the time people put their suitcases and 
stuff in the back seat rather than the trunk." 
While Deputy Moffett ran Defendant's information, Deputy 
Gorham ordered Defendant out of the car while he issued a 
warning citation. The deputy then handed Defendant his 
documentation, and asked Defendant if he was "good to go." 
Defendant said that he was, shook the officers' hands, and then 
started back toward his car. Deputy Gorham then "engaged 
[Defendant] in casual conversation", asking him about the reason 
for his trip, what he did for a living, and so on. During this 
conversation, the officer noticed indicators that made the officer 
believe that Defendant was "under a high level of stress." At some 
point, Deputy Gorham asked for consent to search the trunk. The 
Defendant said "sure", and popped the trunk for the officers, and 
lifted the lid. Prior to opening the trunk, officers asked the 
Defendant whether he was in possession of a large amount of 
money, and the Defendant replied that he had $55,000.00 in his 
trunk. During the subsequent search of the trunk officers found 
one bag which, among other things, contained a large sum of 
money which was bound in thousand dollar stacks. The cash 
found in the trunk and on Defendant's person actually amounted to 
approximately $72,000.00. The officers that the packaging of the 
money was suspicious because the officers "run into people all the 
time that have valid reasons to carry this much money with them ... 
and they never ... package it that way ... And they usually always 
have documentation of what I intend to do with this money, where I 
got it, so on, so forth." 
Deputy Gorham asked the Defendant what he intended to 
do with the cash, and Defendant said he was going to Seattle to 
visit his girlfriend and to purchase a motor home. He told the 
officer that he travels with that much cash all of the time. 
Defendant said that this was his second trip to Seattle. Deputy 
Gorham found it suspicious that Defendant was headed to Seattle, 
because the officer knows Seattle to be a major distributor of 
marijuana. 
(R., pp.201-203 (citations omitted).) 
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Officer Moffett then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
where he found marijuana and the officers arrested Petersen. (Tr., p.28, L.12 -
p.29, L.12.) Once arrested, Officer Gorham noticed Petersen "calmed down a 
lot" and "didn't shake anymore." (Tr., p.30, L.25.) 
The state charged Petersen with money laundering, attempted destruction 
of evidence, misdemeanor possession of marijuana and possession of 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.86-88.) Petersen filed a motion to suppress claiming the 
"search and seizure and arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal 
justification." (R., pp.98-99.) Petersen also filed a motion to dismiss the 
information charging him with money laundering and attempted destruction of 
evidence based his claim of an insufficiency of evidence presented at preliminary 
hearing to support a finding of probable cause. (R., pp.131-149.) Following a 
hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement and subsequently 
issued a memorandum decision and order granting Petersen's motion to dismiss 
on the basis that there was no probable cause present to search the passenger 
compartment of Petersen's vehicle and granting his motion to dismiss count I of 
the information charging Petersen with the offense of money laundering because 
it found "no evidence, only mere speculation" of a violation of the money 
laundering statute. (R., p.219, 225.) 
The state appeals from the memorandum decision and order on 
defendant's motion to suppress and motion to dismiss. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in granting Petersen's suppression motion based 
on its conclusion that there was insufficient probable cause to believe 
incriminating evidence would be found in the passenger compartment of 
Petersen's car after evaluating the totality of the circumstances including 
the large amount of bundled cash found in the trunk considered in light of 
Petersen's demeanor? 
2. Did the district court err when it concluded that the testimony presented 
during the preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause to believe 




The District Court Erred In Granting Petersen's Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to a search of 
the passenger compartment of Petersen's vehicle. The district court erred in 
determining that there was insufficient probable cause to believe there would be 
evidence of a crime found in the passenger compartment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 
_, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 
309 (2004). 
C. The District Court Erred In Granting Petersen's Suppression Motion 
Based On Its Finding That There Was Insufficient Probable Cause That 
Incriminating Evidence Would Be Located Within The Passenger 
Compartment Of Petersen's Vehicle 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "A 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
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Idaho 474,479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) The automobile exception 
is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 
667 (1998). 
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement allows the police to 
search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 
131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 
P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). The analysis of whether an officer had probable cause 
for an automobile search is whether, based on the objective facts, a magistrate 
would have issued a warrant under similar circumstances. State v. Murphy, 129 
Idaho 861,864,934 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 
121, 123, 795 P.2d 15, 17 (Ct. App. 1990). Determining the existence of 
probable cause is "a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances ... , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found .... " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable 
cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but only the 
"probability or substantial chance" of such activity. ~ at 244-45 n.13. A 
practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all 
that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The facts known to the officers must be 
judged in accordance with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday 
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life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). "If there is probable cause to believe 
a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a search of any 
area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found." Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332,129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009). 
The district court determined there was reasonable articulable suspicion 
to stop Petersen's vehicle based on his failure to "signal for five seconds prior to 
changing lanes" and his unsafe lane change. (R., pp.208-209.) It further 
concluded the police did not unconstitutionally extend the traffic stop when they 
terminated their questioning, and Petersen acknowledged he was "good to go" 
and began to leave prior to the police officers reinitiated contact and further 
questioning. (R., p.215.) The court next held Petersen's consent to search his 
trunk was voluntary. (R., p.217.) The district court, however, incorrectly 
concluded there was insufficient probable cause to search the passenger 
compartment of Petersen's vehicle. 
Prior to the search of Petersen's vehicle, Officer Gorham noticed a 
number of things that, when considered together in light of the entire stop and 
discovery of bundled money in the trunk, were possible indicators of criminal 
activity: Petersen's hands were shaking "quite noticeably" (Tr., p.19, LS.17 -18), 
there was a half-empty 12-pack container of Diet Pepsi on the passenger seat 
next to Petersen (Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.10), the officer saw two cell phones on 
the passenger seat (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-13), and there an air freshener in the center 
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console of the clean car (Tr., p.21, Ls.16-18). The officer testified that taken 
alone, none of the above observations are necessarily of concern, however, 
when you are seeing that, the way the vehicle was set up, the 
nervousness, and the body indicators, and take all the totally [sic] 
of the circumstances, and put them into one, you start to develop 
reasonable suspicion that something else is going on other than 
this person is being pulled over for a traffic stop. 
(Tr., p.22., Ls.15-20.) Additionally, the car Petersen was driving was "a newly 
registered vehicle" and Petersen was on his way to his second trip to Seattle 
from Minnesota by way of Montana to meet a "lady friend of his." (Tr., p.23, 
Ls.11-23.) The police officers discovered a large sum of money in a grocery bag 
inside of a duffle bag located in the trunk, bundled in a manner consistent with 
the bundling of drug proceeds. (Tr., p.27, Ls.7-16.) Although unemployed for 
the previous four years, Petersen claimed to always travel with that much cash 
and then remembered he was going to purchase a motor home in Seattle. (Tr., 
p.27, L.21 - p.28, L.10.) He claimed to have such cash on hand because he 
previously owned a used car dealership that dealt in cash. (Tr., p.30, Ls.19-23.) 
The district court incorrectly concluded there was insufficient probable 
cause that incriminating evidence of money laundering and/or drug trafficking 
would be found in the car based on the discovery of the large amount of money 
in Petersen's trunk when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. (R., 
p.219.) The totality of the circumstances need not point to the existence of 
evidence of a specific crime. In State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 601, 237 
P.3.d 1222, 1227 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court of Appeals found probable cause 
existed to believe evidence of a crime would be found in Newman's vehicle 
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based on the "totality of the circumstances and the objective facts presented to 
the officers": 
in order to establish that probable cause existed to search 
Newman's vehicle, the state was not required to show that the 
officers knew whether the purpose of luring the victim to the park 
was to commit the crime of battery, assault, theft by trick, rape, 
kidnapping, murder, robbery, or any number of other possible 
crimes. All that was required was a showing that probable cause 
existed to believe that evidence of criminal activity could be found 
in the vehicle. 
Here, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause 
based on Petersen's demeanor, the presence of two cell phone, the fact he was 
driving a newly registered vehicle, had made multiple trips to Seattle from 
Minnesota and back, had not been recently employed and had a large amount of 
undocumented cash bundled in a manner consistent with being a drug dealer 
that they would find evidence of a crime in the passenger compartment of 
Petersen's vehicle. Based on the totality of the circumstances and the objective 
facts presented to the officers, probable cause existed to believe that evidence 
of a crime, relating to drugs and cash, would be found in Petersen's car. 
Because there was probable cause to believe there was evidence of 
criminal behavior in the passenger compartment of Petersen's vehicle, the 
district court erred in granting his motion to suppress. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Testimony Presented 
During The Preliminary Hearing Did Not Establish Probable Cause To Believe 
That Petersen Committed The Offense Of Money Laundering 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed the count of money laundering, finding 
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the magistrate court abused its discretion in binding Defendant 
over on the charge of money laundering, and this charge must be 
dismissed, because there is no evidence, only mere speculation, of 
any potential violation of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 
(R., p.225.) Because the record shows the existence of sufficient probable 
cause to believe Petersen committed the crime of money laundering, the district 
court erred in dismissing count I. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A magistrate's finding of probable cause that a defendant has committed 
a public offense should be overturned only upon a showing that the magistrate 
abused its discretion." State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 372, 79 P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (citing State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983); 
State v. Phelps, 131 Idaho 249, 251, 953 P.2d 999,1001 (Ct. App.1998).) 
C. The Testimony Presented At The Preliminary Hearing Provided 
Substantial Evidence That Petersen Committed The Offense Of Money 
Laundering 
The state is not required to prove a defendant guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt at a preliminary hearing. Pole, 139 Idaho at 372, 79 P.3d at 731. "Rather, 
the state need only show that a crime was committed and that there is probable 
cause to believe the accused committed it." 19.:. (citation omitted.) 
The state charged Petersen with money laundering in violation of Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8201, 18-7804 as follows: 
That the defendant, CONRAD WALTER PETERSEN, on or 
about the 14th day of March, 2011, in Kootenai County, Idaho, did 
unlawfully and knowingly and! or intentionally conceal and! or 
transport items of value, to wit: $71,505.00, that he knew was 
intended to be used to commit or further a pattern of racketeering 
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activity, as defined in Idaho Code § 18-7803( d), to wit: possession, 
distribution, manufacture, trafficking, and/or delivery of controlled 
substances, or a violation of the provisions of Chapter 27, Title 3 7, 
Idaho Code; and/ or that the Defendant did knowingly and/or did 
intentionally plan, organize, initiate, finance, manage, supervise, 
and/or facilitate the transportation or transfer of proceeds, known 
by him to be derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, as 
defined in Idaho Code § 18-7803(d), to wit: possession, 
distribution, manufacture, trafficking, and/or delivery of controlled 
substances, or a violation of the provisions of Chapter 27, Title 37, 
Idaho Code. 
(R., p.87.) The statute prohibiting money laundering provides in relevant part: 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally give, sell, 
transfer, trade, invest, conceal, transport, or make available 
anything of value that the person knows is intended to be used to 
commit or further a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 
section 18-7803(d), Idaho Code, or a violation of the provisions of 
chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 18-8201 (1). "Racketeering" is "any act which is chargeable or indictable 
under" a number of specified crimes including the possession, distribution, 
manufacture, trafficking and/or delivery of a controlled substance. I.C. §§ 18-
7803(a)(19); 37-2732. 
Here, the district court found there was 
substantial evidence that [Petersen] knowingly transported and lor 
concealed something of value, but there [were] no facts in the 
record, nor permissible inferences which may be drawn from those 
facts, which would indicate that [Petersen] knew or intended the 
money be used to commit a violation of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho 
Code. 
(R., p.224.) That conclusion is inconsistent with the evidence provided at the 
preliminary hearing. The necessary proof required in this instance was that 
"under any reasonable view of the evidence, including permissible inferences, it 
appear[ed] likely that [the offense of money laundering] occurred and that 
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[Petersen] committed it." Pole, 139 Idaho at 373, 79 P.3d at 732 (citation 
omitted). A review of the record supports the state's position that burden was 
met. 
At preliminary hearing, the officers testified that there was a large amount 
of money found as part of the consensual search of Petersen's trunk. Officers 
located a duffel bag in the trunk containing a grocery sack with thousand dollar 
stacks of money wrapped in rubber bands in a manner consistent with how drug 
dealers wrap their money. (PH Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.16.) The money was 
undocumented and the officer considered it "suspicious." (PH Tr., p.12, Ls.17-
24.) Although Peterson indicated there was $55,000 in the grocery bag (PH Tr., 
p.12, L.10), the actual amount was over $72,000 (PH Tr., p.51, Ls.22-23). 
Although not employed for the past four years, Petersen advised the officer he 
used to run a used car dealership which operated in cash and he "travels with 
that much cash all the time." (PH Tr., p.13, Ls.7-19.) When asked what he 
intended to do with so much cash, Petersen indicated he "was going to Seattle to 
buy a motor home." (PH Tr., p.13, Ls.4-6.) He also told officers, however, that 
his trip to Seattle was his second trip to visit his girlfriend. (PH Tr., p.13, L.20 -
p. 14, L.7.) Officer Moffett testified that he knew of Seattle as a "major distributor 
of marijuana" (PH Tr., p.27, Ls.18-19) and that it was common for someone from 
the east to buy drugs cheap on the west coast and take them back to make a 
"big profit" (PH Tr., p.28, L.5 - p.29, L.5). There was additionally a small amount 
of marijuana located in Petersen's vehicle (PH Tr., p.41, Ls.8-19) as well as a 
receipt for the purchase of over $400 worth of fertilizers and growing methods 
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from a store in Minneapolis, Minnesota (PH Tr., p.61, L.8 - p.62, L.6) and a 
diagram on how to grow marijuana (PH Tr., p.60, Ls.14-15). Petersen's vehicle 
showed a recent temporary registration out of Montana although he was from 
Minnesota and his vehicle odometer showed a high mileage since the 
registration. (Tr., p.56, Ls.8 - p.57, L.1, p.62, L.24 - p. 63, L.2.) Contrary to the 
district court's holding, it is reasonable to conclude based on the evidence 
presented at preliminary hearing that not only was Petersen concealing and/or 
transporting this large amount of undocumented cash, but his purpose was to 
use the money to develop or continue operation of a drug trafficking enterprise. 
Because there the record shows the existence of sufficient probable 
cause to believe Petersen committed the crime of money laundering, the district 
court erred in dismissing count I. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence and dismissing count I of the information. 
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